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Abstract: 
This paper revitalizes the debate of an ethics of contemporary famine. Famine constitutes a distinct 
development challenge that has only received moderate public and academic attention. Singer’s 
Famine Relief Argument from 1972 emphasizing a strong obligation of charitable benevolence 
towards victims of famine, for example, continues to constitute the dominant ethical principle of 
famine. The paper argues this revisionary principle still constitutes a strong and convincing ethical 
argument. However, the dynamics of contemporary famine makes it necessary to expand this 
ethical obligation outside the realm of pure philanthropy. Concretely, the paper argues for the 
obligation of criminalizing famine and prosecuting the perpetrators of famine that have either 
callously allowed famine to unfold or have intentionally created and exacerbated the conditions for 
famine. While such an obligation is not void of ethical dilemmas, a famine ethics relying on 
obligations of charity as well as obligations of criminal prosecution constitutes a superior ethical 
principle for the alleviation of famine.  
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Famine continues to haunt the world. Approximately a quarter million people perished in 
the 2011 Somalia famine, and in 2017 the UN formally had to declare a famine once again, 
this time for the northern-central parts of South Sudan (Checchi & Robinson 2013; UN 
News 2017). Despite these recurring incidents, I argue that famine has not received the 
kind of public or academic attention that it deserves. As a case in point, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are conspicuously silent when it comes to the elimination of 
famine (UNDP 2019). No targets address this most extreme and absurd manifestation of 
humanitarian apathy where hundreds of thousands of people succumb to starvation and 
death despite an abundance of food in the world. The limited attention to famine is also 
evident in ethical debates. Singer’s Famine Relief Argument from 1972 – emphasizing a 
strong obligation of charitable benevolence towards victims of famine – still appears to 
constitute the dominant principle around which scholars position themselves by either 
criticizing the principle or pointing to its continued relevance. I argue that there is a need 
to reengage with famine ethics. While some version of Singer’s Famine Relief Argument 
still appears to be a sound moral principle, I will refocus the ethical debate in the light of 
recent developments in famine research where legal scholars have been particularly active 
in advocating for the criminalization of famine. My main argument is that famine ethics 
need to extend beyond obligations of charitable benevolence to include obligations of 
prosecuting famine crimes.    
  




































































The paper is structured as follows. First, the analytical difference between investigating 
famine and investigating hunger is laid out, and it is argued that an ethics of famine is likely 
to be distinct from food (security) ethics. Second, the paper makes the case that famines in 
this century have not received much attention neither in the public discourse nor in 
academia. In that sense, famine almost rivals hunger as a silent emergency. This also holds 
true for philosophical discussions where famine ethics is still primarily rooted in Singer’s 
Famine Relief Argument (Singer 1972). The paper continues by discussing the validity of 
this principle, arguing that the changing dynamics of contemporary famine necessitate 
going beyond this moral principle of charitable benevolence. One major recent contribution 
to famine research that carries substantial ethical implications is the argument for the 
criminalization of famine. The paper concludes by discussing the ethical arguments for 
including the obligation of famine criminalization in an ethics of famine.  
 
The Distinctness of Famine 
When contributing to a special issue with a focus on food security and hunger, it appears 
particularly pertinent to emphasize how famine constitutes a distinct humanitarian 
challenge that cannot simply be absorbed in studies of hunger and food security. Hunger 
usually refers to the prevalence of undernourishment in a population where the dietary 
consumption is less than the minimum energy requirements deemed necessary for a healthy 
life (usually 2.100 calories/day) (IPC 2012; FAO et al. 2017). A state of chronic hunger 
can persist for years and might lead to child stunting and wasting, inhibit cognitive 
development, increase infant and maternal mortality, and increase susceptibility to 




































































as an idiosyncratic event identifiable by a sudden excess in mortality caused by mass 
starvation and diseases; an understanding shared by most scholars of famine (Sen 1981; 
Howe & Devereux 2004; Devereux 2007; Ó Gráda 2009; De Waal 2018). The important 
academic debates in famine research relate to the dynamics of famine: what are the main 
causes and processes behind such an extraordinary spike in mass starvation? Although 
scholars of famine have somewhat diverging explanations on the causes of famines, there 
is consensus that these explanations differ from those causing chronic undernutrition and 
hunger. There are qualitative differences between studies of famine and studies of hunger. 
Hence, ethical considerations regarding the alleviation of chronic hunger and improving 
food security cannot be directly translated to an ethics of famine. Famines are much more 
closely related to complex emergencies and protracted disasters than they are related to 
chronic hunger. In his most recent monograph on famine, De Waal (2018) explicitly 
emphasizes the need to distinguish famine from (chronic) hunger and malnutrition, arguing 
instead for a closer association with mass atrocities. Similarly, Banik (2010: 224) also 
emphasises the need to “distinguish between acute (famine) and chronic (endemic hunger) 
forms of deprivation and our responses to these.” Famines, therefore, should not be 
understood as the final cataclysmic outcome of a linear trajectory characterized by 
continued deterioration of a country’s nutritional status but as a synergistic outcome of 
complex, long-term and short-term, indirect and nonlinear socio-political dynamics (Howe, 
2018; De Waal, 2018). The flipside of this decoupling is that the ambitious SDG goals 
(UNDP 2019) – aiming to improve productivity and income for small-scale farmers, 
ensuring equal access to land, implementing sustainable food production practices and 




































































but might not suffice for the eradication of famine. The close association of famine with 
complex emergencies and even pogroms will be subject to greater scrutiny later in the 
paper. Empirically, the dissociation between hunger and famine can be exemplified by 
looking at global trends. More than 800 million people still suffer from chronic 
undernutrition. This level has remained relatively stable (and lately slightly increased) 
throughout this century (FAO et al. 2017). The most recent UN report (FAO et al. 2019) 
even talks about a reverting trend after 2015 from a steady decline for decades to a slow 
increase in the number of people who suffer from hunger to an estimated 820 million 
people. Contrast this to the fact that only around 20 million people today are considered 
vulnerable to famine (U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome 2017; Mercy Corps 2017). 
Famines have gone from being a recurrent threat in most developing countries to being 
restricted to small enclaves in the developing world – mainly in fragile states in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Ó Gráda 2009; De Waal 2018). Unfortunately, this is not the case with 
hunger, which remains endemic across most regions even in the face of a general increase 
in development: the undernutrition prevalence rates stand at 20 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 15 percent in South Asia, 8 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, and 7 
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Development Indicators, 2018).  There 
are fewer famines today and less people succumb to them than at any other time in modern 
history (both in relative and absolute terms) (Rubin 2019). This, of course, does not 
diminish the catastrophic impact of any one famine. The 2011 Somalia famine constitutes 
one of the most lethal disasters of the 21st century. It does, however, suggest that the 
eradication of famine does not necessitate great strides human development or putting an 




































































easy to prevent from a policy perspective (Sen 1995: 7). Preventing famine demands such 
a limited redistribution of resources in a contained period of time that even very poor 
nations should be able to lift the burden, not least when aided by international humanitarian 
organizations. More than twenty years ago, De Waal made the ethical argument that there 
has been no excuse for famine for almost a century (De Waal 1997: 7).  Ethically, this only 
places an additional premium on the eradication of famine: we could essentially eradicate 
famine without necessarily having to solve the problem of chronic hunger and extreme 
poverty. Famine should evoke a moral response that is more direct and compelling than 
the ethical arguments in favour of development assistance (Thompson 2010: 209). Part of 
the explanation for our failure to eradicate famine can be ascribed the limited attention to 
famines. 
 
Famine – A Whispering Emergency 
The over 800 million people suffering from daily hunger is a silent catastrophe and the 
belated progress in this field is a stain on otherwise impressive humanitarian achievements 
during the last two centuries. However, this paper will present evidence to suggest that full-
blown famines can almost rival hunger emergencies in terms of deficiency of international 
attention. Sen has famously argued that governments in democracies primarily react to 
famines because of their high visibility in the media and public discourse (Sen, 1999). 
Thus, politicians have incentives to react promptly to sudden famine disasters where 
fatalities are concentrated in time and space in contrast to low visibility challenges such as 
widespread hunger. This, according to Amartya Sen, would help explain why India has 




































































multiple starvation related deaths each year. India has effectively prevented large-scale 
famine for more than 75 years but still has the largest number of hungry people in the world 
(Banik 2016). The strength of the link between democracy, media attention and famine 
mitigation has been subject to some debate (Rubin 2009a; Plümper & Neumayer 2009; 
Burchi 2011). In general, there appears to be some evidence that portrayal in the media 
impels politicians to react to mitigate the suffering from disasters (Boin et al. 2005; Kahn 
2005; Flores & Smith 2013). This is good news since disasters are usually very visible in 
the media. As a case in point, the 2017 event that gained the most global readership of 
online news in a single day was Hurricane Irma (Economist 2017). The problem with 
famine is that it is one of the most overlooked disasters. If hunger can be characterized as 
a silent emergency, then famine constitutes nothing more than a whispering emergency. 
The whisper of famines builds on two pieces of empirical evidence.  
 
The first relates to the public interest in famine. Consider the 2011 Somalia famine as an 
example. It was the most lethal disaster of the 21st in a single country: 260.000 people 
perished in matter of weeks (Checchi & Robinson 2013). That number of fatalities eclipses 
some of the worst natural disasters in this century such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
(with an estimated 220.000 fatalities) and the 2004 Tsunami that hit Indonesia (with an 
estimated 165.000 fatalities) (EM-DAT 2019). To proxy for global public interest in the 
famine relative to other disasters, the paper draws on data from Google Trends, which 
measures the usage of key search terms relative to other select key terms (Google 2018). 
Figure 1 compares the 2011 Somalia famine with four other major disasters from 2008 




































































Tsunami, and the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. Figure 1 illustrates that the relative interest in 
the Somalia famine is negligible, accounting for only 0.5% of the most searched disasters 
in the period, namely the concurrent 2011 Japanese Tsunami.1 In fact, famine is dwarfed 
relative to any other generic disaster search term I could think of such as flood, earthquake, 
tsunami, hurricane, volcano, pandemic, avalanche, storm or cyclone. Assuming some 
relationship between public interest in a given disaster and google search terms related to 
that disaster (google accounts for 90 percent of searches worldwide), the global public 
attention to famine disasters is indeed limited.   
 
--- Insert Figure 1 --- 
 
One might argue that while famines may not be highly visible globally, they might define 
national public discourses to a much greater extend. However, contemporary famines tend 
to occur in states that censor media and public debate (North Korea) or in fragile states 
where the media and state institutions are weak or non-existent (South Sudan and Somalia). 
This also holds true for countries currently vulnerable to famine: Yemen, Syria and Nigeria 
(WFP 2018). Thus, it is often left to the international community to warn and gather 
information about impending famines. Even in the relative free country of Niger, it was 
left to a non-governmental organization (Doctors without Borders) to warn about the 
impending famine in 2005 and to advocate for extensive interventions to mitigate its impact 
(Rubin 2009b). With unfertile conditions for national public debates and investigative 
journalism in most famine prone countries today, the seemingly limited global public 





































































The second piece of evidence rests on limited academic interest in famine. To proxy for 
academic interest, the paper applies an updated version of Rubin’s (2019) measure of 
academic interest. The academic interest is proxied by the annual average Web of Science 
Social Science Citation articles that have referred to a specific disaster in their 
title/abstract/keywords, counting from a year after the disaster until the most recent full 
year (in this case 2017). The graph below has juxtaposed the fatalities for six major 
disasters in the twenty-first century (red columns, right axis) with the average annual 
number of articles in the Web of Science (blue columns, left axis). 
 
--- Insert Figure 2 --- 
 
The discrepancy between scholarly interest in the 2011 Somalia famine and fatalities is 
striking. A meagre annual average of 2,5 articles have been written on one of the most 
lethal humanitarian catastrophes in the twenty-first century whereas the academic articles 
published on Hurricane Katrina exceed that of all the other five disasters combined. This 
suggests that attention to famine is negligible even in academic circles. This also holds true 
for the academic field of ethics. Not many papers have been published on famine after 
Singer’s famous article Famine, Affluence, and Morality from 1972 and most have been 
moderately cited.2 The contributions have mostly taken offset in Singer’s Famine Relief 
Argument, and largely positioned themselves as either followers or critics of the moral 
principle. It thus appears pertinent to re-engage with Singer’s influential Famine Relief 





































































Singer’s Famine Relief Argument 
Peter Singer has famously coined the Famine Relief Argument where the obligation of 
saving a child from drowning in a shallow pond is equated with that of displaying 
considerable charitable benevolence to the victims of famine (Singer 1972). While most 
would agree that it is virtuous to aid victims of famine, Singer emphasizes an obligation of 
charitable benevolence. The 1971 East Bengal humanitarian crisis caused Singer to wonder 
why affluent people throughout the world appeared to be unresponsive to the suffering. He 
developed the following analogy: “If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child 
drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes 
muddy, but this is insignificant, while death of the child would presumably be a very bad 
thing” (Singer 1972: 231). Why, Singer then asked, would most people help the drowning 
child without hesitation while not feeling obliged to provide the same help in other 
situations of life and death? For Singer, there was no moral distinction between aiding a 
drowning child in the local pond and aiding a starving child in East Bengal. He therefore 
constructed the much-cited Famine Relief Argument: “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972:231). The principle provides a strong 
case for the obligation of aiding victims of famine, because so little must be sacrificed so 
that others can live. Whether the analogy is a drowning child in a pond or a child about to 
be smashed by a runaway train, Singer’s basic argument for a moral obligation of charitable 






































































Two main types of objections have been forwarded against Singer’s Famine Relief 
Argument: one that accepts the premise of an ethical obligation to aid the victims of famine 
but questions the extent of philanthropy, and another that questions whether there actually 
is an ethical obligation to aid victims of famine.3  
 
Several scholars have argued not against the moral obligation of aiding victims of famine 
but against a too demanding call for charitable benevolence (Otteson 2000; Kuper 2002; 
Cullity 2004; Swanton 2009; Timmerman 2015, 2018; Seipel 2016). Their basic intuition 
is that asking people to sacrifice to a point where the marginal utility value of the next 
sacrifice would make them worse off than the recipients goes against commonsense 
morality and would constitute an ethical principle that very few people would actually 
meet. Otteson argues (2000: 200) that “a moral position that makes a father immoral for 
buying his daughter a ribbon for her hair so stretches the limits of common moral intuition 
as to suggest a reductio ad absurdum.” Kuper (2002) touches on the same weakness when 
arguing that the real-world situation would resemble a situation in which Singer would 
walk past a pond of fifty children close to drowning each day. His life would quickly need 
to be turned into that of a lifeguard rather than that of a philosopher, which would not 
appear morally just; neither for Singer nor society at large. Timmerman (2015) reiterates 
that Singer’s analogy should rightly be based on many drowning children, in which case it 
would be morally permissible to let a child drown on occasion to pursue other experiences 
in life that do not involve constantly saving children. Similarly, Swanton (2009) addresses 




































































psyche. She argues that moral demands should “not tax our strength to the point where the 
self wits away, we neglect our children and loved ones, we ignore ethics altogether as an 
everyday and pervasive phenomenon in favour of self-interest, and resentment becomes 
rife” (Swanton 2009: 122). Cullity (2004) presents an interesting circular line of reasoning 
where Singer’s extreme demand on moral duties actual undermines his own argument. 
Singer’s ethics short-circuits when people generally do not live lives where the pursuit for 
own fulfillment is completed abandoned in order to help others. Ergo, if it is wrong to live 
a life that is not altruistically focused, then there cannot be good reasons for helping a 
person achieve such an immoral life (Cullity 2004: 137). In short, the Famine Relief 
Argument produces too many immoral individuals to retain any proper moral meaning. 
Based on Singer’s Famine Relief Argument, for example, one can devise an argument 
against having children because the foregone costs of raising children can be better spent 
on famine relief (Rachels 2014). 
 
Singer has subsequently forwarded a weaker ethical principle that leaves out the 
comparable perspective, and just states that one should give to the point where one would 
sacrifice something of moral significance (Singer 2007). Similarly, Cullity (2004) suggests 
a moderate demanding morality based on an aggregate approach where the cost of aiding 
others is considered cumulatively (rather than marginally). This would entail sacrifice that 
“each of us could make without depriving our lives of worthwhile achievement, enjoyment, 
close personal relationship, community involvement, understanding, integrity, or 
autonomy to any significant degree” (Cullity 2004: 186). In a famine context, such 




































































famine prevention. The combined funding gap for all the humanitarian appeals during the 
2011 Somalia famine, for example, amounted to 460 million USD (OCHA 2011). The 
World Food Programme estimates that 2.8 billion USD is needed to effectively aid the 20 
million living on the brink of famine (WFP 2018). That is less than half a percent of the 
wealth held by the 10 richest people in the world (Forbes 2018).   
 
Other scholars have questioned whether there really is an obligation to aid victims of 
famine (Goodin 1998; Currie 2000; Kekes 2002; Miller 2007; James 2007). While most 
would agree that it is virtuous to aid victims of famine, they question whether there is a 
moral obligation to do so. The basic argument is that Singer’s cosmopolitan moral codex 
should be replaced morals that are dependent on context. One implication of living in 
specific moral contexts is that we feel more inclined to help people in our immediate sphere 
of social relations. Goodin (1988) differentiates between general duties that we have 
toward other people and special duties that we have to those in a special relation to us. 
Miller (2007) also claims that we should allow diverse moral principles to hold in different 
contexts; not least for pragmatic reasons since nation-states are still the prime engines of 
distributive justice. In his 2000 monograph on famine and hunger, Currie also argues that 
“although we might subscribe to a general Good Samaritan law that transcends national, 
ethnic or legal borders, the boundaries of the political community remain significant in that 
general moral duties that humans hold to confront human suffering hold extra weight to 
those within their own polity” (Currie 2000: 50).. James (2007) introduces the concept of 
unique dependency to draw a distinction between aiding the child in the pond and saving 




































































relationship we have with those in need. In Singer’s analogy, there is a determinate 
individual relying on you (and only you) for survival, while such a relationship is absent 
in Singer’s famine relief argument. Humanitarian relief efforts fail to establish a unique 
dependence, because assistance is mediated through relief organizations. While Singer 
seeks to equate the two situations, James points to the fact they are distinct: the pond case 
calls on the action of the Good Samaritan, while the distant suffering from famine calls on 
the assistance of the Good Humanitarian.  
 
Singer has countered his critics by asserting that the Famine Relief Argument should not 
appeal to whatever is the current practice of beneficence. Behavioral studies, for instance, 
indicate that we are inclined to be much more generous towards identifiable victims (child 
in pond) compared to more faceless statistical victims (famine victims) (Small et al. 2007). 
This, of course, does not make it ethically just. While we might have an evolutionary 
inclination to help members of our own group/tribe or focus on identifiable sufferers, 
Singer argues (2007: 480) that “a practice that evolved under different conditions has no 
normative force for us today”. We are therefore faced with a stalemate situation where 
“followers of Singer insist upon revising our intuitions in order to shield their principle 
from logical refutation” while “critics of Singer argue that we should revise the principle 
in order to protect our intuitions.” (Siepel 2016: 98). To break this stalemate in the context 
of famines, one can just assume, for the sake of argument, that Singer’s moral principle of 
charitable benevolence should hold stronger for citizens close to the atrocities. Banik 
advances the ethical standpoint that “if we agree that radical inequalities in local society 




































































then one can place additional emphasis on the proximity factor and thereby argue for 
enhanced moral responsibility of local elites” (Banik 2010: 242). Today, most poor people 
live in middle-income countries amid wealthier classes (Sumner 2012). In a famine 
situation, limited redistribution nationally would in most cases suffice to prevent people en 
masse from dying of starvation. Thus, limiting the extent of sacrifice and narrowing down 
the number of people faced with a moral obligation of charitable benevolence still produce 
revisionary ethics of famine that exceeds current levels of philanthropy multifold. The real 
question is whether charitable benevolence is sufficient to alleviate famines. The following 
will argue that we need to pursue other ethical principles as well.  
 
The disconnect between Singer’s ethical analogies and the contemporary famine 
discourse  
The philosophical semantics surrounding the Famine Relief Argument often draw heavily 
on analogies. Singer’s own child in the pond is the most notable. Other scholars have 
suggested alternative analogies that illuminate their own moral principle in relation to 
Singer’s, but rarely have ethical debates reflected on the implications of the general use of 
analogies. Unger (1996) sets out to support Singer’s famine relief argument using more 
than fifty analogies, starting with an analogy of whether one should write a lifesaving check 
to UNICEF. Similarly, Timmerman (2015; 2018) also relies on many analogies in his 
defense of a weaker version of the Famine Relief Argument where he articulates the 
dilemma between saving several drowning children or spending time in the theater. The 
purpose of the analogies and metaphors used by Singer, Unger and others is not only to 




































































principles. Singer’s argument that we are morally obligated to aid famine victims is not 
difficult to grasp conceptually, and there is really no need for illustrative examples – with 
the recent famines there are enough examples in real life – if not for setting a context in 
which ignoring the child would be blatantly amoral. The persuasive power of analogies can 
only be admired: Singer’s pond analogy has surely been a strong driver for altruism. My 
claim here is merely that these gains come at a price, as they remove the ethical principles 
from the empirical phenomena to which they relate. One could risk working with an ethical 
premise that does not necessarily mirror present empirical dynamics. Analogies suffer from 
two limitations: they dislodge the ethical arguments from their empirical foundation, and 
they are inherently static. Therefore, while the philosophical discussions themselves 
display much dynamism, raging back and forth, they still implicitly or explicitly refer back 
to the original analogies. This makes it difficult to capture the extent to which famines have 
changed over time. Today, there might be a need to reconnect the ethical arguments to the 
dynamics of contemporary famine.  
 
Singer’s Famine Relief Argument built on an optimism shared by many at that time that 
famines could be eradicated by acts of philanthropy. This is probably best exemplified by 
Bod Geldof’s 1984 massive Band Aid charities for victims of the Ethiopian famine. But 
the optimism also extended to academia. One of the most acknowledged famine 
frameworks at that time, the entitlement approach, clearly viewed “famines as economic 
disasters, not as just food crises” (Sen 1981: 162). As such, they could be remedied by 
economic redistribution. Indeed, many of the famines in the 1970s took place inside 




































































Bangladesh famine, the 1972-1974 Ethiopian famine and the 1971-74 Sahel famines all 
unfolded in the absence of institutional collapse, violent internal conflict and political 
control (Sen 1981). Today, however, fragile institutions and violent conflicts have been the 
primary causes of the 2011 Somalia famine, as well as the 2017 South Sudanese famines 
(Heaton, 2012; Maxwell & Fritzpatrick, 2012; Fergusson, 2013; De Waal, 2018). 
Analysing the North Korean famine in the 1990s, the 2011 Somalia famine and the 2017 
South Sudanese famine through an economic lens only appears to be insufficient. This 
implies that famine ethics should not only be concerned with charitable benevolence. This 
is also echoed in Cullity’s (2004) call to pursue other efforts than humanitarian aid, “and 
to encourage the structures of political accountability that can counteract its worst effects” 
(Cullity 2004: 47). Similarly, Devereux (2007: 14) argues that “if famines are preventable 
social and political phenomena, rather than unavoidable natural disasters, the social and 
political actors and institutions should be held accountable for allowing famine to happen.” 
In an everyday moral context, there is little doubt that ethnic cleansing is wrong. 
Nevertheless, the moral claim needs to go beyond calls for individual obligations of charity. 
In Singerian terms, it would difficult to prevent something bad from happening by 
sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, not because people are unwilling 
to do so (although this is regrettably surely also the case) but because there is no linear 
relationship between sacrifice and outcome. In a famine context, there is no transparent 
market exchange where inputs can be traded for a certain outcome; where twenty dollars 
can buy a life. Thus, there appears to be a rationale for an ethics of famine to also embrace 




































































including ethnic cleansing, pogroms and other types of political/religious killings and 
violence. 
 
Consider the North Korean famine in the 1990s. The fact that a million people perished in 
North Korea during the 1990s due to famine is a humanitarian catastrophe (Haggard & 
Nolan 2007). North Korea experienced some substantial exogenous shocks that were both 
related to consecutive years of harsh climatic conditions as well as geo-political changes 
(with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wavering support of China). However, 
these exogenous triggers only turned catastrophic because of the government’s long-time 
deficient agricultural policies, the reluctance to accept international famine relief, and the 
general misuse of aid and humanitarian assistance as balance-of-payment support for 
military and luxury imports (Haggard & Nolan 2007: 50; UN Human Rights Council 
2014). This strong connection to politics means that famine mitigation should not only be 
a question of charitable benevolence but must also involve the actions of the North Korean 
regime (UN Human Rights Council 2014). When regimes purposely block or misuse aid, 
charitable benevolence becomes an impotent force for famine mitigation.  
 
The 2011 South Somalia famine constitutes another example. While the whole Horn of 
Africa suffered from one of the worst droughts for sixty years, the famine itself appeared 
to only strike southern Somalia (the southern Bakool and lower Shabelle regions). Al-
Shaabab, an extremist Islamic militant group controlling southern Somalia, actively and 
deliberately exacerbated the famine. Al-Shabaab only allowed a few humanitarian 




































































accept involving Al-Shabaab in all the distribution of food (Jackson & Aynte 2013: 16). 
One of the most detrimental policy decisions by Al-Shabaab was prohibiting famine 
victims to migrate from the affected area; cantonment camps were set up to imprison 
people trying to escape Al-Shabaab territory (Ferris & Petz 2012). Al-Shabaab also used 
the famine to increase people’s dependence on the organization for survival. Volunteer 
fighters were lured with promises of a piece of fruit every day, and the famine has been 
described as “the most convincing recruiting sergeant of all” (Fergusson 2013: 176). The 
relief agencies did in fact manage to raise funds at an unprecedented volume and speed 
(Maxwell & Majid 2016; OCHA 2011). However, mitigating the suffering appeared more 
dependent on whether the humanitarian agencies could actually gain access to the Al-
Shabaab dominated areas than it was dependent on the funding raised.  
 
An Ethical Obligation of Prosecuting Famine Crimes  
The dynamics of these recent famines have spurred a new interest in famine from legal 
scholars who argue that famine should be treated as crimes against humanity, and that 
perpetrators of famine need to be prosecuted through international law (Marcus 2003; 
Howard-Hassmann 2005, 2016; DeFalco 2011, 2016; Aloyo 2013; Kearney, 2013; Sankey 
2014; Duthie 2014; Malk, 2017). The concept of famine crimes was initially introduced by 
famine scholars in the 1990s (De Waal 1993; Keen 1994) but has recently been revitalized 
and refined by legal scholars. Marcus (2003: 248) was among the first legal scholars to 
argue that “since famines are often functionally equivalent to genocide, it makes no moral 
or legal sense not to extend the protections of international law to famine-prone 




































































that famine ‘is not so much a question of causes and solutions but one of responsibility, 
criminal liability, perpetrators, bystanders, victims and survivors.’  DeFalco (2011) argues 
that leading members of the communist party in Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge) should be 
prosecuted for crimes against humanity based on the famine of 1975-79 which killed 
upwards a million civilians. He concludes that “courts and tribunals have avoided 
addressing the culpability of individuals who cause mass famines for too long, especially 
now that humankind has entered an era where such tragedies are entirely avoidable.” He 
continues in a later piece by arguing more generally that “the creation or enforcement of 
famine conditions can often be accurately characterized as a widespread or systematic attack 
on a civilian population, making crimes against humanity a promising entry point for 
addressing general famine conditions outside the context of a targeted genocidal attack or 
armed conflict” (DeFalco 2016: 52). Howard-Hassmann (2016: 214) also proposes a new and 
distinct UN treaty to protect the right to food that should expand on the existing articles in the 
UN Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
These calls for famine criminalization, published mostly in international law and justice 
outlets, have begun to resonate in key international organizations and civil society 
organizations. One of the most comprehensive investigations of non-violent human rights 
violations, for example, has been conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council 
with respect to the North Korean famine (UN Human Rights Council 2014). The 
Commission concluded that party officials had committed crimes against humanity by 
implementing actions, decisions and policies known to have led to mass starvation, death 
by starvation and serious mental and physical injury (UN Human Rights Council 2014: 
339). No court, however, has yet entered a conviction for an international crime predicated 




































































expanding international law and the reach of the ICC to prosecute famine crimes is 
difficult. There is a growing consensus on the limits of criminal law and the legitimacy of 
the ICC among many African states (Roach, 2016; Niang, 2017). Hitherto, the ICC has 
opted to prosecute openly violent crimes that are most extensively and concretely referred 
to in the Statute’s articles, and where the burden of proof is easier to lift.  
 
Disregarding the questions of short-term practical feasibility, famine criminalization also 
faces challenges as an ethical principle. The important thing to note here is that it induces 
other moral dilemmas than do Singer’s famine relief arguments. The ethical arguments for 
punishment have traditionally rested on two distinct ethical principles: a utilitarian 
perspective where punishment increases the general well-being in society and a 
redistributive perspective that primarily pursues justice and punish offenders for their 
wrongdoing. The presented legal arguments for criminalizing famine primarily rests on the 
utilitarian principle: punishment should discourage and deter the use of mass-starvation as 
an acceptable political or military strategy. The criminalization of famine (where famine 
crimes are prosecuted) should serve as a reminder to all leaders in the world that famine 
crimes will not be tolerated. Whether this will reduce the risk of famine is ultimately an 
empirical question. Naturally, merely prosecuting perpetrators of famine crimes will not 
lead to the abolishment of such abuses in the world. Two systematic empirical studies of 
ICC’s ability to deter human rights violations do strongly suggest that the organization has 
a significant positive impact: both studies (using different proxies and analytical models) 
concluded that the ICC through various channels deters leaders from committing various 




































































therefore, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that famine criminalization will reduce 
the risk of famine in the long haul. There might also be an educational effect of such treaties 
that could influence the behavior of some states in certain instances (Howard-Hassmann 
2016). An increased attention to and prosecution of famine crimes (the intentional use of 
starvation against civilians is already prohibited in the Rome Statute; ICC 1998: articles 7 
and 8), rather than having direct effects of deterrence through punishment, might lead to 
more incremental changes of international norms to a point where ethnic or political 
cleansing by famine is considered no differently than cleansing by means of direct 
violence.  
 
Famine criminalization introduces the need to distinguish between intent, misfortune and 
incompetence as primary drivers for famine without the proper tools and insights to do so. 
International criminal law often demands both actus reus (physical act) and mens rea 
(intent) for prosecution. Article 30 of the The Rome Statute, for example, states that “a 
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.” In cases of famine, the boundaries between actus reus and mens rea are 
blurred due to the substantial temporal dimension in famine crimes.4 A local official in a 
province in North Korea during the 1990s might have acted negligent or incompetently 
when crafting a set of policies that triggered mass starvation (actus reus). However, 
according to existing international law the official can only be prosecuted when she, aware 
of the consequences of her actions, continues to enforce policies that exacerbate famine 




































































realizes the error of his way within complex political systems with overlapping authorities 
is difficult to pinpoint, let alone prove in a court of law..   
 
Famine criminalization also presents other ethical dilemmas. An obligation of famine 
prosecution moves responsibility from the individual levels (philanthropy) to the level of 
states and international organizations (prosecution). It puts into play the well-known moral 
dilemmas of the international communities’ responsibility to protect human rights vis-à-
vis states’ rights to uphold national sovereignty. And famine criminalization introduces the 
ethical challenge of seeking to assign individual responsibility for a multi-causal 
catastrophe. By implication, assigning individual criminal responsibility for a famine 
means downplaying other potential underlying causes of famine such as broader socio-
economic and geopolitical systemic factors. Even contributions that highlight the 
importance of the political level do not only highlight the importance of agency, but also 
political systems and structures at different levels (Devereux 2007; Rubin 2009a; De Waal 
2018). Howard-Hassmann (2016) highlights the paradox of holding states responsible for 
protecting and promoting human rights but holding individuals responsible for their 
violation. Applying the lens of famine crimes to the 2017 famine in South Sudan, for 
example, appears to be too blunt an instrument to capture the dynamics of the myriad of 
underlying national and international factors that compounded to generate the famine. 
Imagine, for example, that the famine threatening situation in Yemen deteriorates into a 
full-blown famine. Prosecuting food crimes would emphasize individual liabilities for the 
famine, thereby ignoring the multidimensionality of famines caused by a plethora of 




































































institutions, colonial legacy, salary collapse, geopolitics and so on). Without linearity, it is 
difficult to assign legal responsibility, but famines are often the outcome of non-linear 
synergistic interactions among different socio-political factors (Howe 2018). Hence, 
obligations of charitable benevolence as well as prosecution of famine crimes might not 
suffice to effectively alleviate famine. They are ill-equipped to address the deeper socio-
political structural causes of famine. Still, an ethics of famine based on both these 
obligations stands stronger than one based on either one obligation, as they address key 
different dynamics of contemporary famines.  
 
Conclusion – A Famine Ethics of Contemporary Famines   
Famine constitutes a distinct challenge for humankind that has yet to be overcome. While 
famines continue to constitute a recurrent threat for vulnerable people in the most fragile 
corners of the world, they have been consistently overlooked in the global public discourse 
and in academic works. In that sense, the public disregard associated with famines can 
match the silent emergency of hunger. Attention to the ethical dimensions of famine also 
appears to have been negligible after Singer’s groundbreaking Famine Relief Argument in 
1972. This paper attempted to revitalize the debate of famine ethics by taking departure in 
the ethical discussion surrounding Singer’s Famine Relief Argument but adding two 
important interrelated perspectives: (i) the dynamics of contemporary famine makes an 
exclusive reliance of charitable benevolence obsolete; and (ii) the recent calls to 
criminalize famine have injected new interesting ethical dilemmas to the debate. 
Consequently, the paper argues for a famine ethics based on two pillars of ethical 





































































1. An obligation of charitable benevolence based on a weak version of Singer’s 
Famine Relief Argument. An obvious concrete moral principle, inspired by 
Macaskill et al.’s (2018) Very Weak Principle of Sacrifice, could state that members 
of the middle-class ought, morally, to use at least 10 percent of their income to 
effectively combat famine and extreme destitution. This principle would still pose 
demands that by far exceed what are currently being honored. It would effectively 
close the financing gap for the key humanitarian agencies involved in famine 
prevention, and make certain that access to financial resources and logistical 
infrastructure is not the constraining factor for a world without famine 
 
2. An obligation to criminalize famine and prosecute perpetrators that intentionally 
allow a famine to unfold. This obligation would help avert famines that cannot be 
easily remedied through philanthropy due to their link to malicious policies (what 
Marcus (2003) has coined faminogenises). While the direct discouraging effect on 
any one individual perpetrator of such famine crimes might be limited, getting 
states and international organizations to adhere to such principle would increase 
attention to famine and could help develop and cement norms for what is acceptable 
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appears limited. While Singer’s article has been cited 954 times (as of July 24, 2019), the average number 
of citations for the subsequent 19 articles was three.  
3 Naturally, these two categories do not cover all ethical objections that been waged against Singer’s 
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principle invalid due to a long litany of flaws with development aid and humanitarian interventions. 
4 Mens rea thus captures both first-degree famine crimes of intent and second-degrees famine crimes of 
recklessly ignoring the consequences of implemented policies (see also Marcus 2003 and Howard-
Hassmann 2016).  


































































Figure 1: Google search terms for five major disasters, 2008-2018 June.  
 
Legend: The maximum score of 100 represents the highest number of searchers for a particular term 
at a given point (“Japan Tsunami” in March 2011).  The other scores are percentages of this 
maximum search interest: Haiti earthquake 83%; Nepalese earthquake 15%; Sichuan earthquake 
8% and the Somalia famine 0.5%.   
Source: Google 2018.  
 
Figure 1 Click here to access/download;Figure;Figure 1.docx
Figure 2: Juxtaposing average annual published academic articles with disaster fatalities for six major 
disasters, 2005-2015.  
 
Legend: The black column expresses the number of fatalities (right axis), while the striped column 
refers to the average annual number of Web of Science articles that contained the specific disaster in 
the topic (left axis).  
Source: Web of Science 2019; EM-DAT 2019.   
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